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ABSTRACT
Adversarial defense is a popular and important research area.
Due to its intrinsic mechanism, one of the most straightfor-
ward and effective ways of defending attacks is to analyze
the property of loss surface in the input space. In this paper,
we define the local flatness of the loss surface as the maxi-
mum value of the chosen norm of the gradient regarding to
the input within a neighborhood centered on the benign sam-
ple, and discuss the relationship between the local flatness and
adversarial vulnerability. Based on the analysis, we propose
a novel defense approach via regularizing the local flatness,
dubbed local flatness regularization (LFR). We also demon-
strate the effectiveness of the proposed method from other
perspectives, such as human visual mechanism, and analyze
the relationship between LFR and other related methods theo-
retically. Experiments are conducted to verify our theory and
demonstrate the superiority of the proposed method.
Index Terms— adversarial defense, loss surface geome-
try, gradient-based regularization.
1. INTRODUCTION
Deep neural networks (DNNs) have been successfully and
widely used in many computer vision areas, such as pose es-
timation [1, 2], object detection [3, 4] and super-resolution
[5, 6]. Despite their excellent performance under the standard
setting, recently, researchers found that DNNs are vulnerable
to some well-designed pixel-wise perturbations. Those per-
turbations are invisible to human, whereas they are able to
fool the network with high probability. For example, some at-
tack methods, such as fast gradient sign method (FGSM) [7]
and project gradient descent (PGD) [8] can reduce the accu-
racy of the network to almost 0% on CIFAR-10 dataset.
To reduce the adversarial vulnerability, some adversarial
defense methods are proposed. They can be roughly divided
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into three categories, i.e., adversarial training based defense
[8, 9], detection based defense [10, 11], and reconstruction
based defense [12]. Among these methods, one of the most
straightforward ways is to analyze the loss surface with re-
spect to the input, since the adversarial attack is to find the
worst-case perturbation in the input space. Specifically, in
[13], the relationship between the average value of the chosen
norm of the gradient regarding to input space and the adver-
sarial vulnerability was discussed, based on which the authors
proposed a defense method by regularizing that value. Re-
cently, Qin et al. [14] pointed out that the previous method did
not consider the local characteristics, and it could have a rela-
tively poor performance when the loss surface was not linear
enough in the local area. Instead, they proposed to achieve the
local linearity based on regularizing the difference between
the loss and its first-order Taylor expansion.
Is the local linearity really necessary for the adversarial
defense? In this paper, we make a systematic discussion on
the relationship between adversarial robustness and the local
flatness of loss surface. To be more precise, the local flatness
can be measured by the maximum value of the chosen norm
of the gradient with respect to the input within a neighbor-
hood centered on the benign sample. We prove that whether
a sample is easy to be attacked is related to the flatness of
loss surface around that sample. Based on this discussion, we
propose a novel gradient-based regularization, the local flat-
ness regularization (LFR) to enhance the adversarial robust-
ness. Besides, we compare our method with the human visual
mechanism and the local Lipschitz property to further verify
the validity of the method. And discussion on the relationship
between our LFR and other previous related defense methods
is theoretically conducted, which demonstrates that most of
them are special cases of LFR under certain conditions.
The main contributions of this paper can be summarized
as follows:
• We give a systematic discussion on the relationship be-
tween the local flatness of loss surface and the adversar-
ial robustness. Based on the analysis, we propose a new
regularization, the LFR, for the adversarial defense.
• We theoretically discuss the relationship between LFR
and previous related defense methods.
ar
X
iv
:1
91
0.
12
16
5v
3 
 [c
s.C
V]
  1
7 M
ay
 20
20
• Experiments and comparison with the human visual
mechanism and the local Lipschitz property are in-
cluded, which further verify the validity of the pro-
posed method.
2. LOCAL FLATNESS REGULARIZATION
2.1. Preliminaries
Suppose L(·) is the loss function (such as cross-entropy or the
K-L divergence), and Bp(x, ) is the -ball centering around
x under `p norm, i.e., Bp(x, ) = {x′| ||x′ − x||p ≤ }.
In this paper, we focus on the defense of `∞ attack. This
defense is representative, since Bp(x, ) ⊂ B∞(x, ), (∀p ≥
0), and therefore the adversarial robustness under `∞ norm
indicates the adversarial robustness under any another norm.
Definition 1. The local flatness of the loss surface (generated
by classifier C) around B∞(x, ) is defined as
γC(x, ) = max
x′∈B∞(x,)
||∂xL(x′)||1. (1)
The reason why γC(x, ) measures the local flatness can
be easily explained. By the definition, gradient (at point x′)
indicates the direction in which the loss is changed at the
highest rate. As such, ||∂xL(x′)||1 can be regarded as the
fluctuation at x′, and therefore maxx′∈B∞(x,) ||∂xL(x′)||1
measures the flatness of local B∞(x, ).
In the following part, we analyze the relationship between
the local flatness and adversarial robustness theoretically
Theorem 1. ∀x′ ∈ B∞(x, ), L(x′) ≤ L(x) +  · γC(x, ).
Proof. ∀x′ ∈ B∞(x, ),∀t ∈ [0, 1], we have
tx′ + (1− t)x ∈ B∞(x, ).
Therefore
L(x) = L(x) +
∫ 1
0
∂L(tx+ (1− t)x)
∂t
dt
= L(x) +
∫ 1
0
∂L(tx′ + (1− t)x)
∂x
· ∂x
∂t
dt
= L(x) +
∫ 1
0
∇xL(tx′ + (1− t)x) · (x− x)dt
≤ L(x) +  · max
x′∈B∞(x,)
||∂xL(x′)||1.
Theorem 1 indicates that we can defend the attack under
`∞ norm by regularizing the local flatness.
Except for the previous perspective, the effectiveness of
this regularization can also be verified through the following
aspects:
Verification from the aspect of human visual mechanism
It is widely accepted that the human visual system relies
mainly on key components rather than all pixels of the whole
image. For example, when categorizing a picture as a cat, the
eye only pays attention to the pixels of the cat and ignores the
background (such as the grass or the house).
Considering the gradient of the loss function with respect
to each pixel of the image x, i.e., the ∂xL(x). The (abso-
lute value of) gradient of the loss function at the pixel mea-
sures how important the pixel is to the prediction. Although
there is no well-developed metric to identify which pixels
are important to human vision system, using only key pix-
els at least means that the ∂xL(x) should be sparse, which
can be constrained by the `1 norm. This is also consistent
with the phenomenon that the salience map is significantly
more human-aligned for adversarially trained networks, as
observed in [15]. In addition, since the human visual system
is not sensitive to small pixel-wise changes, i.e. it is robust
under certain pixel-wise perturbations, taking the local prop-
erty of the gradients into consideration is rational.
Verification from the aspect of local Lipschitz property
Lemma 1. Let L(·) be a Lipschitz continuous function, then
maxx′∈B∞(x,) ||∂xL(x′)|| ≤ Lip(L), where Lip(L) is the
Lipschitz constant of loss L in the local B∞(x, ). [16]
Lemma 1 indicates that regularizing γ(x, ) has a direct
connection with regularizing Lip(L), which is effective for
the defense since ∀x′ ∈ B∞(x, ),
||L(x′)− L(x)|| ≤ ||x′ − x|| · Lip(L) ≤  · Lip(L),
according to the definition of Lipschitz property.
2.2. Proposed method
Following the analysis above, we propose a novel method to
defend `∞ attack as follows:
min
θ
E(x,y)∈D{Lnormal(x, y) + λ · max
x′∈Bp(x,)
||∂xL(x′)||1︸ ︷︷ ︸
LFR
},
(2)
where Lnormal(·) is the normal training loss (such as cross-
entropy or K-L divergence), and λ is a non-negative hyper-
paramter.
The minimax problem (2) can be solved by alternatively
solving the inner-maximization and the outer-minimization
sub-problems as follows:
• Inner-maximization: given model parameters θ, for
each x ∈ D, we generate an adversarial example x′ by
x′ ← argmax
x′∈B∞(x,)
||∂xL(x′;θ)||1. (3)
Equation (3) could be solved by different adversarial
attack methods, such as PGD [8].
• Outer-minimization: given x′, for each x ∈ D, the
parameter θ is updated by
θ ← argmin
θ
E(x,y)∈D{L(x, y;θ)+ (4)
λ · ||∂xL(x′;θ)||1}.
We update θ using back-propagation [17] with the
stochastic gradient descent [18].
3. COMPARISON WITH RELATED METHODS
In this section, we compare our method with some previous
related defense methods under `∞ attack. Specifically, we
prove that both adversarial training and first-order based ad-
versarial defense are special cases of our method under certain
conditions.
3.1. Link to the first-order based defense
Definition 2. To defend the attack under `∞ norm, first-
order based adversarial defense is to minimize L(x) +
λ||∂xL(x)||1. [13]
Theorem 2. First-order based adversarial defense is a spe-
cial case of LFR with  = 0
Proof.
||∂xL(x)||1 = max
x′∈B∞(x,0)
||∂xL(x′)||1.
3.2. Link to the adversarial training
Lemma 2. max||α||p≤1αβ = ||β||q, ( 1p + 1q = 1). [19]
Theorem 3. Adversarial training using -scaled FGSM at-
tack under `∞ norm is equivalent to minimizing L(x) +  ·
maxx′∈B∞(x,0) ||∂xL(x′)||1 up to terms of order 2.
Proof. According to the first-order Taylor expansion,
L(x+α) = L(x) +α · ∂xL(x) +O(α2). (5)
Therefore the optimal adversarial training using -scaled
FGSM attack can be solved approximately up to terms of or-
der 2 by
max
||α||∞≤
L(x)+α·∂xL(x) = L(x)+ max||α/||∞≤1 ·
α

∂xL(x).
(6)
According to Lemma 2,
(6) = L(x) +  · ||∂xL(x)||1. (7)
In other words, adversarial training is a special case of
first-order defense to a certain extent. By Theorem 2, the
statement is proved.
4. EXPERIMENTS
4.1. Adversarial defense under white-box attacks
Baselines Selection. We select trade-off inspired adversar-
ial defense via surrogate-loss minimization (TRADES) [9],
local linearization regularization (LLR) [14] and PGD-based
adversarial training (AT) [8] as the baseline methods in the
following experiments, since they are the representatives of
the state-of-the-art defense methods, the most advanced loss
surface geometry based defenses, and the most classical de-
fense methods, respectively. Besides, we also train a model
with the standard training process, dubbed “Standard”.
Training Setup. We conduct the experiments in the MNIST
dataset [20], and adopt a simple CNN architecture for train-
ing. The simple CNN consists of four convolutional lay-
ers followed by three fully-connected layers. Specifically,
we set the perturbation 1 = 0.3, the perturbation step size
η1 = 0.01, number of iterations K1 = 40 in inner max-
imization problem, and run 100 epochs with learning rate
α1 = 0.01 and batch size m1 = 128. These settings are
learned from [9]. The hyperparamter λ of the proposed LFR
is set to 0.02. For the hyperparameters of other defenses, we
set 1/λ = 1 for TRADES, λ = 4 and µ = 3 for LLR accord-
ing to the setting suggested in their papers.
Attack Setup. We evaluate the adversarial robustness of dif-
ferent methods under fast gradient sign method (FGSM) [7],
project gradient descent (PGD) [8], momentum iterative fast
gradient sign method (MI-FGSM) [21] and decoupled direc-
tion and norm attack (DDNA) [22]. The attack setting we ap-
ply here is as follows: iteration Kt = 40, step size ηt = 0.01
and the maximum perturbation t = 0.3.
As shown in the Table 1, the accuracy of the Standard
model drops drastically under these attacks whereas LFR still
achieves valid performance. When compared with other base-
lines, LFR performs best under all attacks and obtains great
improvements. Under stronger attacks i.e. the PGD40 and
MI-FGSM, LFR outperforms the SOTA baselines by even
larger margins.
Table 1. Robustness evaluation under various attacks.
Defense Clean
Attack Type
FGSM PGD40 MI-FGSM DDNA
Standard 99.30% 33.69% 2.04% 2.55% 14.16%
AT 99.52% 97.26% 95.37% 94.17% 94.05%
TRADES 99.49% 97.54% 95.71% 94.79% 95.91%
LLR 99.62% 97.94% 95.63% 94.60% 93.95%
LFR 99.47% 98.14% 96.82% 96.01% 96.89%
4.2. Visualization of decision surfaces
In this section, we analyze the effectiveness of LFR from the
geometrical property of the decision surface. In particular,
we visualize the decision surfaces of chosen models by using
the method proposed in [23]. The decision value Lˆ(x) of a
sample x is defined as Lˆ(x) = py − maxi 6=y pi, where pi
is the logit value of label i, and y is the ground-truth label.
(a) (b)
Fig. 1. Comparison between the decision surfaces of the Standard and LFR models on two randomly selected samples in the
MNIST dataset. First row: the 3D decision surfaces and their corresponding 2D version of the Standard model. Second row:
the decision surfaces of the LFR model. In the 3D version, X and Y axis represent two different perturbation directions with the
value indicating the perturbation size. Z-axis indicates the decision value. The prediction is correct if and only if the decision
value is positive, which is represented as red areas.
Fig. 2. Loss surfaces of the LFR model. X and Y represent
perturbation size along two directions. Z-axis indicates the
value of loss function.
Hence, this value can evaluate the decision confidence with
Lˆ(x) > 0 indicating that the prediction of x is correct and
vice versa. We visualize the decision surfaces of the proposed
LFR (λ = 0.02) and another model with standard training,
i.e. the Standard model (λ = 0) on two randomly selected
samples in MNIST dataset, as shown in Fig.1.
As shown in Fig.1, the decision surfaces between these
two models behave quite differently. Compared with LFR, the
decision surfaces of the Standard model have sharper peaks
and larger slopes, implying that the decision is vulnerable to
small perturbations. In other words, the decision confidence
can quickly drop to negative areas when the model is fooled
after being attacked by small pixel-wise adversarial perturba-
tions. In contrast, the decision surfaces of LFR are rather flat
and locate on a plateau with positive decision confidence in
the vicinity of the sample. As such, the outputs of LFR still
lie in the correct classification regions after being attacked.
We also visualize the loss surfaces L(x) of the LFR
model. Results on two randomly selected samples are shown
in Fig. 2. The loss surfaces are flat rather than linear, while
the corresponding model is still robust. Therefore, it is the
local flatness rather than the local linearity that is critical to
adversarial defense.
4.3. The effect of hyperparameter
In this section, we further analyze how λ could affect the per-
formance.
Fig. 3. Clean and adversarial accuracy of the LFR model w.r.t
different λ.
As shown in the Fig. 3, the improvement of adversarial
robustness led by LFR is significant, especially when the λ is
well-selected.
5. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we propose a new gradient-based regulariza-
tion, the local flatness regularization (LFR), based on the re-
lationship between the adversarial vulnerability and the local
flatness of loss surface. The local flatness is defined as the
maximum value of the chosen norm of the gradient regard-
ing to the input within a neighborhood centered on the benign
sample in the paper. We theoretically discuss the relationship
between LFR with previous related defense methods, and fur-
ther verify the effectiveness from both the aspect of human
visual mechanism and local Lipschitz property. Verification
experiments are conducted, which demonstrates the superior-
ity of the proposed method.
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